

JAMAICA SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND

ISO 14001:2004 CERTIFIED

Investing for Community Development



IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT: Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project



May 2014

Currency Equivalents

(Exchange Rates Effective March 29, 2006 and December 31, 2013)

Currency Unit = Jamaican Dollar (J\$)
World Bank Board Approval: US\$ 1.00 = J\$65.50
Closing Date: US\$1.00 = J\$106.38

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALSD	Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CBC	Community-Based Contracting
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CRC	Citizens' Report Card
GoJ	Government of Jamaica
HEART Trust/NTA	Human Employment and Resource Training Trust/National Training Agency
ICBSP	Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project
ICDP	Integrated Community Development Project
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
JSDF	Japan Social Development Fund
JSIF	Jamaica Social Investment Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFI	Microfinance Institution
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MIS	Management Information System
MOTWH	Ministry of Transport, Works and Housing
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NSWMA	National Solid Waste Management Authority
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
NCC	National Contracts Commission
NCTVET	National Council on Technical and Vocational Education and Training
NLA	National Land Agency
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PMC	Project Management Committee
SDC	Social Development Commission
TOR	Terms of Reference
YER	Youth Education & Recreation

**Government of Jamaica
Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project**

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Data Sheet

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Jamaica	Project Name:	Inner City Basic Services for the Poor
Project ID:	P091299	L/C/TF Number(s):	
ICR Date:		ICR Type:	
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	JAMAICA
Original Total Commitment:	USD 29.95M	Disbursed Amount:	USD
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: Jamaica Social Investment Fund			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:		Effectiveness:	5/1/2006	6/27/2006
Appraisal:	3/1/2006	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	3/29/2006	Mid-term Review:		2/8/2010
		Closing:	12/31/2011	12/31/2013

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by World Bank ICR	
Outcomes:	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by World Bank ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Satisfactory	Government:	Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators (WB ICR)			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
General water, sanitation and flood protection sector	38	
Other social services	35	
Urban Transport	17	
General energy sector	5	
Microfinance	5	

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Urban services and housing for the poor	25	
City-wide infrastructure and Service Delivery	25	
Participation and civic engagement	24	
Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction	13	
Other social development	13	

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Jorge Familiar Calderon	Pamela Cox
Country Director:	Sophie Sirtaine	Caroline D. Anstey
Sector Manager:	Anna Wellenstein	John Henry Stein
Project Team Leader:	Angelica Nuñez del Campo	Abhas K. Jha
ICR Team Leader:	Valerie Joy Eunice Santos	
ICR Primary Author:	Elizabeth Hunter Eiseman	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objective

The project development objective is to improve quality of life in 12 Jamaican inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements through improved access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, enhanced community capacity and improvements in public safety. Specifically, the project will: (a) increase access and improve the quality of water, sanitation, solid waste collection systems, electricity, roads, drainage and related community infrastructure for over 60,000 residents of poor urban informal settlements through capital investments and innovative arrangements for operations and maintenance; (b) facilitate access to microfinance for enterprise development and incremental home improvement for entrepreneurs and residents in project areas; (c) increase security of tenure for eligible households in project areas; and (d) enhance public safety through mediation services, community capacity building, skills training and related social services.

Revised Project Development Objective

Objective was not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Access to improved basic infrastructure and financial services and security of tenure for 60,000 inner city residents			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	60,000		61,953
Date achieved				12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved (103% achievement): The project facilitated multiple interventions in the selected communities over a seven-year span; to avoid double-counting, the actual value recorded above is the sum of the number of beneficiaries for the relevant intervention with the furthest beneficiary reach, for each community.			
Indicator 2 :	% of beneficiaries who feel safe or very safe			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	27.75%	75%		91%
Date achieved				12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved: According to the Impact Evaluation (p. 60), 91% of survey respondents indicated that they felt safe or very safe in their communities. This exceeds the target value by 16%. The 2013 Citizens' Report Card (CRC) multi-stage cluster survey of six representative Inner City Basic Services for the Poor (ICBSP) communities found that 75.4% of respondents felt safe in their communities by day; 68.8% felt safe by night.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

The Intermediate Outcome Indicators were formally revised during the Supervision Mission of October 19-28, 2009. The revised intermediate indicators are below. Since almost all indicators were changed, the targets from the approval documents are generally not comparable with the formally revised target values. Where possible, information on the achievement of the original targets has been included in the comments.

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 1:	Number of households with new or improved access to water			
Relevant Original Indicators:	1. % of households that report access to water with ‘good’ pressure 2. % of beneficiaries satisfied with the quality and pressure of water service			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	2,490	3,576
Date achieved			12/31/2012	12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (144%): Improved access to water provided for households in 10 communities. Fire hydrants were also provided for the same 10 communities.</p> <p>Original Target Progress:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> On the 2013 CRC, 37% of respondents reported ‘good pressure’ and a further 31% reported that pressure was ‘mostly good, but occasionally low’. The original target for access to ‘good’ pressure was 65%. If both groups are considered, the target has been achieved. On the 2013 CRC, 54% of surveyed community residents rated the quality of access to potable water as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. A further 18% rated the quality of access as ‘fair’. Overall, 58% reported satisfaction with their potable water supply, which is 32% less than the original target of 90%, but 14.8% higher than baseline. 			

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 2:	Number of households with new or improved access to sewer networks			
Relevant Original Indicators:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. % of households in project areas with access to in-house sanitation facilities 2. % of households satisfied with quality of sanitation facility 			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	364	478
Date achieved			12/31/2010	12/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (131%): Work was done on the sewer networks in Federal Gardens in 2010. In 2012, a blockage in the main sewer line in the community required additional work to be done.</p> <p>Original Target Progress:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. On the 2013 CRC, 58% of respondents reported having access to a flush toilet inside the house. This represents an increase of 7% over the baseline, but still 22% below the original target. 2. On the 2013 CRC, 34.3% of surveyed community residents rated the quality of access to sewer main as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. A further 18% rated the quality of access as ‘fair’. Overall, 59% reported satisfaction with their sanitation services. Neither baseline nor targets were specified in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD). According to the Baseline Survey Report, “A substantial majority (79 per cent) of those with a sewer connection [33% of those surveyed] had no complaints about it.” This would indicate an improvement in quality of access. Satisfaction is not entirely comparable because all respondents were surveyed in the CRC, whether or not they were connected to the sewer system. 			

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 3:	# of persons covered by each solid waste skip			
Relevant Original Indicator:	% of beneficiaries receiving solid waste collection service at least once per week			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	9,568	7,513
Date achieved				12/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Not Achieved (78.5%): In total, 55 skips and 1 truck were handed over to the National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA) to assist with solid waste collection. Due to the narrowness of community streets and the lack of suitable locations (in terms of proximity to community residences and businesses), the number of skip sites had to be reduced to 31; these were decided upon through consultations with both the communities and the NSWMA. In addition, some communities requested drums instead of skips. Ultimately, 30 skips (or the equivalent in drums) were installed in 11 ICBSP communities; the final skip, in Flanker, has not yet been placed in the community by the NSWMA. The remaining skips were placed based on needs across the island and are currently in use.</p> <p>Original Target Progress: The PAD listed a 71.7% baseline, with a 90% target by the project's close. The Baseline report gave somewhat lower levels, with 65.1% using the public collection service (and an additional 1.8% using a private collection service) and 70% of the 65% (or 45.6% of the total ICBSP population) reporting public collection of at least once per week. According to the 2013 CRC, 75.7% of respondents reported weekly collection. This represents an improvement of 30 percentage points over the figure in the baseline survey, but only 4 percentage points over the PAD baseline. However, given the percentage point difference between the PAD baseline and target (18.3 points), the project can be said to have at least achieved this difference. On the 2013 CRC, 54% of surveyed community residents rated the quality of access to garbage collection services as 'good' or 'excellent'. A further 20.7% rated the quality of access as 'fair'. Overall, 67% reported satisfaction with their sanitation services.</p>			

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 4:	Km of paved road surface rehabilitated and maintained			
Relevant Original Indicator:	Km of paved road surface rehabilitated and maintained			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	TBD	10.36	22.30
Date achieved				5/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (215%): Road network improvements were highly regarded in the communities: on the 2013 CRC, 86% of the community residents' surveyed thought that the quality of road network service was fair or better (67% thought good or excellent). Approximately 80% of the road network in need of rehabilitation across the twelve communities (i.e., approximately 60% of all road network in these communities) was rehabilitated under the ICBSPP. The baseline survey did not include a measure of community satisfaction with the road network. However, 75.1% of community residents surveyed in 2005 described their roads outside of their houses as 'poor' or problematic in some way; a further 2.7% had good dirt roads. The current satisfaction levels are emblematic of the reversal of the 2005 situation.</p>			
Final Indicator 5:	Number of formal microfinance loans approved and disbursed			
Relevant Original Indicators:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. # of formal microfinance loans disbursed in project communities 2. % of households in which members have accessed loans from a formal lending institution 3. # of beneficiaries having opened bank accounts 4. # of repeater loans provided in project areas 			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	171	402
Date achieved			12/31/2009	5/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (235%): The actual bids received from the microfinance institutions were in excess of the formally revised target. After the first round of contracts, the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) and the World Bank agreed that no further rounds should be pursued. The contracted microfinance institutions (MFIs) have continued lending in the ICBSPP project areas and other inner city areas, following the close of the official contracts.</p> <p>Original Target Progress:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No information for indicator #1 is included on page 41 of the PAD, but the indicator is included in the list of intermediate indicators on page 40. The contracted MFIs submitted approximately 20 loans in excess of what was approved. These loans were largely not approved 			

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
	<p>due to their being outside of the project area, although the large majority were also to clients living and/or working in poverty-stricken inner city communities in Jamaica.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Approximately 324 households were given access to an approved microfinance loan under the ICBSP. This represents 2.3% of the total number of households within the ICBSP project areas. The original target for the first year of ICBSP implementation (representative of 1 or 2 rounds of contracts) was for an increase of 3.1%. 3. COK Sodality Credit Union was the only one of the contracted MFIs to require clients to open savings accounts with the institution if the client did not already have. As such, at least 228 clients opened bank accounts as a result of the intervention. Due to prevailing cultural norms, residents were unwilling to discuss financial details with the survey teams, so further information is unavailable. 4. Of the approved loans, 75 were repeater loans, given to 33 clients. Additional repeater loans were disbursed subsequent to the close of the JSIF contracts. 			
Final Indicator 6:	Number of applications for land registration made to the National Land Agency			
Relevant Original Indicator:	Number of titles provided to project beneficiaries			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	200	753
Date achieved				
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (376.5%): The actual value achieved figure represents applications for splinter titles made to the National Land Agency (NLA) within the project area. 710 Splinter titles have been received to date by the Ministry of Transport, Works, and Housing (MOTWH). As at April 8, 384 lots had been marketed and are, therefore, ready for the next stage in the process (i.e., preparation of Instruments of Transfer).</p> <p>Original Target Progress: The target for this indicator was to have been decided during project implementation. The 384 lots marketed represent those closest to titling, assuming ability to pay for any outstanding lot cost.</p>			

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 7:	Number of subprojects in which CPTED principles are applied in infrastructure design			
Relevant Original Indicators:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. % of street lights constructed under the project in working order over time 2. Increase in levels of community satisfaction with community and recreational facilities 3. % of beneficiaries who feel safe or very safe (differentiated between inside and outside the home) 			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0		15	55
Date achieved			12/31/2010	12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (367%): This indicator, in addition to roads, community centres and other subprojects measured by other indicators, includes general community space construction, rehabilitation and expansion subprojects that conformed to CPTED requirements. These included the construction, rehabilitation, and expansion of parks, sporting facilities, and schools, <i>inter alia</i>, as well as the substitution of corrugated metal fencing (zinc fence) with concrete block walls. The improvements to design by incorporating CPTED principles have been noted in focus groups and at least one external report as increasing feelings of community safety and security.</p> <p>Original Target Progress:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Eight lampposts were constructed under the project to light recreational facilities, but no street lights were constructed. All communities currently have street lights and the provision of additional street lighting was not viewed by community members as a relative priority in comparison to other infrastructure investments. 2. On the 2013 CRC, 54% of surveyed community residents rated the quality of access to community facilities as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. A further 18.6% rated the quality of access as ‘fair’. 77% of respondents reported that they were ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with their respective community centre. No information was reported on this indicator in the baseline survey and the PAD suggests that targets were TBD. However, the baseline survey does indicate that 40% of all ICBSB community residents surveyed indicated the existence of a community centre in their community; at the time of the 2013 CRC (prior to the completion of three of the fixed centres and the four mobile centres), this had improved to 68.7%. 3. Although the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Impact Evaluation specified that the data collected on this indicator should be 			

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
	differentiated between inside and outside the home, the draft report did not include this information. The Baseline Study also did not differentiate between inside and outside the home.			
Final Indicator 8:	# of persons who participated in programmes or activities for community-based crime- and violence-reduction and -prevention			
Relevant Original Indicators:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. % of beneficiaries who feel safe or very safe (differentiated between inside and outside the home) 2. % increase in CBO membership 			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0		3,270	37,140 ¹
Date achieved				12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (1136%): The strong implementation of the Public Safety component, generally, and the Mediation & Conflict Resolution subcomponent, in particular, allowed for the participation of many persons – especially at-risk young men and women – in project activities. In 2013 alone, the beneficiaries of the subprojects counted under this indicator totalled 8,979 – almost 275% of the target figure.</p> <p>Original Target Progress:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. See information for Final Indicator #7, Original Indicator 3, above. 2. Over the course of the ICBSP, JSIF facilitated the creation of over 15 community-based organisations (CBOs) and assisted at least 5 others (through technical cooperation, facilitation of legal registration, etc.). Unfortunately, data on the total % increase in CBO membership across the communities is unavailable. 			

¹ Beneficiary numbers are collected by subproject and are collated annually; as such some double-counting is likely, due to some beneficiaries having participated in multiple subprojects over multiple years.

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 9:	# of persons who participated in education and employment programmes or activities			
Relevant Original Indicators:	See Final Indicator #8.			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	4,785	32,691
Date achieved				12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved (683%): The education-related subcomponents of the ICBSP – Youth Education & Recreation (YER) and Alternative Livelihoods & Skills Development (ALSD) – received high satisfaction ratings from community participants.			
Final Indicator 10:	Number of persons who obtained certificates as a result of project programmes			
Relevant Original Indicators:	See Final Indicator #8.			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	220	815
Date achieved				12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved (370%): The integration of lessons learned into the continued implementation of the ALSD subcomponent allowed for improved results in this indicator as the project progressed. The new approach to certification was able to support participants' needs more effectively, resulting in higher retention and graduation rates. Additionally, the subcomponent responded to market demand by entering into new areas of training (videography, photography, computer animation, landscaping, etc.) as the project progressed. So far, 91 persons have accessed full-time employment as a direct result of training received under the ICBSP. Additionally, 18 ICBSP-trained environmental wardens are expected to receive full-time employment through the Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP), to be continued by the NSWMA after project close.			

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 11:	Number of training and workshops provided to Parish Councils and CBOs			
Relevant Original Indicator:	CBOs effectively implement community-based subprojects			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	0	-	20	91
Date achieved				12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved (455%): Beneficiaries received a variety of capacity-building training, including financial management, grant-writing, leadership, planning, networking, communication, project management, sustainability, disaster management and team building. Some organisations received multiple training sessions, to better cement the lessons in terms of practice. Most trainings were supplied to CBOs, but the Parish Councils also were given training sessions to build employee capacity and equipment to improve the productivity and efficiency of the local government organisations.</p> <p>Original Target Progress: The original indicator target was for CBOs to have effectively implemented community-based subprojects in all years. The community-based contracting methodology was used throughout the life of the ICBS, with much success in terms of the implementation of subprojects by CBOs. Community-based contracting (CBC) proved to be an effective community development tool considering the development of skills that were otherwise lacking in the communities prior to the intervention. Some benefits cited by beneficiaries included the capacity building of Project Management Committee (PMC) members (e.g. in leadership, management skills, bookkeeping skills and communication skills). The experience added by the project has served to make CBOs more self-reliant and capable of initiating other development projects on their own. The technical skills base of the community also grew based on the hands-on training received on-site. Some labourers also seized the opportunity to become certified or upgrade their skill levels, thereby adding value to the skills base at the community level. Using the CBC methodology, the community had full control of the decisions that affected them, and they were involved in all stages of the implementation activities.</p>			


Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Final Indicator 12:	JSIF obtains and adheres to ISO 14000 certification			
Relevant Original Indicators:	JSIF obtains and adheres to ISO 14000 certification			
Value (Quantitative or Qualitative)	No ISO 14000 certification	ISO 14000 certification obtained and maintained [by June 2010, through end of project]	-	ISO 14000 certification obtained and maintained
Date achieved				1/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<p>Achieved: In January 2009, the JSIF received ISO 14001:2004 certification. The JSIF completed its recertification audit in 2011 and was recertified; no major non-conformances were noted. The next recertification audit is due in 2014; all annual surveillance audits have been passed with no major non-conformances. In 2013 JSIF was named winner of the 2013 Jamaica Environmental Action Award (JEAA) in the waste management category. Work done under ICBSP, including the donation of a waste collection truck and skips to NSWMA, and the placement of the latter in the communities, was the basis for the award.</p> <p>The process of achieving and maintaining this certification has strengthened the JSIF's institutional capacity to incorporate environmentally-sound practices into project implementation; environmental safeguards are implemented in all projects undertaken, regardless of the funding source.</p>			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	PDO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
10	19-Feb-2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	14.65
11	18-Dec-2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	19.28
12	22-Jun-2012	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	22.40
13	26-Jan-2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	25.49
14	18-Aug-2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	28.71
15	28-Dec-2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	31.20

H. Restructuring (if any)

I. Disbursement Profile (as of 4-Dec-2013)



Jamaica Social Investment Fund
JM Inner City Basic Services for the Poor (P091299)
Implementation Completion Report
Borrower's Assessment

The following comments serve as an assessment of the Government of Jamaica's achievements regarding the project design, implementation and operational experience in the execution of IBRD loan agreement no. 7148 – JM. These comments will reflect on the lessons learned throughout the implementation of the project.

I. Project's Context

- 1.1 In 2004, the year in which project design began, the major crime and murder rates both reported significant increases. The murder rate continued to rise in 2005. Much of the criminal activity was concentrated in certain urban and peri-urban areas considered 'inner city communities'. Among other common characteristics, these communities tended to exhibit increasing levels of public insecurity and suffer from poor access to basic services, low educational attainment and consistently high structural unemployment (due to low educational attainment, dearth of proper training, skills mismatch, few nearby employment opportunities and hiring discrimination against community residents).

II. Project's Relevance at the Time of Design

- 2.1 The project was very relevant to the Borrower (Government of Jamaica; GoJ). It supported the GoJ's efforts to meet Millenium Development Goal targets and contributed to national poverty-, crime- and violence-reduction initiatives. The IC BSP also incorporated lessons learned under the implementation of other inner city urban renewal programmes.

III. Project's Design (PDO, Components)

- 3.1 The IC BSP was designed on the basis of a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach and financed small- and medium-scale infrastructure and social projects. The selection of project communities was led by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and involved the Ministry of National Security, the Social Development Commission (SDC) and JSIF. Hence, the project design was aligned to national priorities and reflected a multifaceted understanding of the needs of the targeted communities.
- 3.2 The Project was structured with three components, each with subcomponent activities reflected in the indicators and aligned to the PDO. The components were adequate and were largely clear in content, organised, and implementable.
- 3.3 The Project's design was innovative because it was the first in the country to take an integrated approach to crime- and violence-prevention. Instead of hard policing and paramilitary force, the IC BSP used infrastructure and public safety methodologies to address crime and violence in the target areas. The addition of the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) Grant allowed for innovation through the development of a national crime observatory to present timely and reliable crime statistical data with

coverage for the 12 ICBSP communities and the five major parishes where crime is deemed to be highest. The inclusion of this component was intended to facilitate the disaggregation of crime data for the monitoring and evaluation of the ICBSP and by extension other crime prevention Projects being undertaken by the government of Jamaica and other donor agencies. The Grant also provided support to the 12 communities under its public safety component through community action planning and small soft projects for implementation. This subcomponent helped to enrich and increase the reach of beneficiaries within the ICBSP communities that the ICBSP would not have otherwise been able to achieve on its own.

- 3.4 The pre-selection of the ICBSP communities was another innovation; the JSIF feels this is most appropriate to interventions focusing on inner city communities (in contrast to rural communities). Pre-selection allowed the ICBSP to provide a focused approach over multiple years on the selected communities, which is necessary to break the cycle of crime and violence in the inner city context. One gap of this approach was the lack of complementary funds to provide for interventions along a more demand-driven methodology to both inner city communities peripheral to those selected and rural communities in general. These funds, had they been provided, would have helped to reduce the feelings of resentment and alienation from residents of communities neighbouring those of the ICBSP, for whom interventions could not be provided. Such funds, in the case of rural communities, would have also allowed for the assuaging of the feeling that inner city communities were benefiting due to their ‘badness’ – a moral hazard of providing funds solely to communities with severe crime and violence problems; other poor communities with better crime and violence outcomes may feel that they have to become ‘bad’ to benefit from development assistance.
- 3.5 The use of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) techniques was also innovative. CPTED considerations have subsequently been incorporated into the JSIF’s Management Information System (MIS) and Technical Review Committee, to ensure that all of JSIF’s relevant infrastructure interventions, regardless of donor, may benefit from the guidelines.

IV. Risks

- 4.1 The ICBSP PAD identified five critical risks. Of these, four were largely successfully mitigated. Crime and violence was sporadic and affected infrastructure implementation minimally, in only two communities. The ICBSP successfully built community capacity to allow for community engagement and ownership of project investments, which mitigated the major risks to the project posed by crime and violence. Environment and involuntary resettlement frameworks were used effectively. Ultimately, the microfinance and land tenure subcomponents were not limited by demand.
- 4.2 Although the project did suffer from limited breakdown of Memoranda of Understanding with service providers and local authorities, the extensive consultations during project preparation resulted in partners’ responsibilities being undertaken as far as was practicable (given resource constraints).
- 4.3 Other risks included the use of CBC, particularly for basic infrastructure investments and the ability of the project to establish a culture of service provider payment given limited

income flows. CBC investments are comparatively low value individually, but cumulatively significant. The limited initial capacity of the community groups made necessary capacity building and limits on the number and value of CBC works contracts. Regarding bill payment, although there is evidence of payment following the electrification project in Bucknor, beneficiaries still found it difficult to pay given their income. This limitation further makes it difficult for the project to persuade utility providers of any difference in cultural change, even if one exists.

V. Project's Implementation

5.1 Factors that contributed to successful implementation included:

- 5.1.1 Community and wider stakeholder involvement in subproject selection: provided clear evidence of the relevance and demand for project investments.
- 5.1.2 Community Liaisons: Social Officers and CLOs were engaged in outreach and capacity building activities with project beneficiaries. This was instrumental to improving intervention relevance to needs and community ownership and participation in planning, construction and maintenance activities.
- 5.1.3 Flexibility of indicators: allowed for project activities to be reviewed and adjusted according to changes in demand and economic growth industries.
- 5.1.4 Communication at the national and parochial levels: helped to raise awareness of project activities, highlight successes and promote results. This helped to expand participation and ownership by community residents.
- 5.1.5 Synergies with JSDF Grant: allowed for a more coordinated and targeted approach donor fund expenditure within the same geographic space, with similar development objectives. This optimised beneficiary coverage and subproject intervention scope and thus allowed for greater innovation and flexibility in sub project designs.
- 5.1.6 Partnerships: the establishment of linkages and coordination with other providers of services within targeted communities assisted with expanding and deepening impact of project activities e.g. Digicel Foundation, Citizen Security and Justice Programme, SDC, CHASE Foundation, Food for the Poor, etc.

5.2 The most significant delay to project implementation was the lack of suitability of the pre-formulated infrastructure designs. Over 50% of the designs had to be redone. Each design took about 6 weeks to 3 months to complete, resulting in a cumulative delay of at least 1 year, with some designs being done concurrently.

VI. Monitoring & Evaluation

6.1 The project's original baseline survey was weak; the Bank-hired consultant did not report survey results for the control communities and used sample sizes (to which the Borrower agreed at the time) that produced margins of error of 10% or higher in some communities and may have resulted in inaccurate baseline measurements of community indicators. Subsequent consultants hired under the project expressed unwillingness to use the same methodologies. The selection of only four controls for the project's twelve communities and the non-reporting of the control baselines reduced the strength of the project's final impact evaluation by rendering a robust difference-in-differences approach impossible.

- 6.2 The project's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) design assumed that regular surveys of the project population would be carried out; if not, proper reporting on original project indicators would be impossible. Due to accuracy concerns, informal surveys were not heavily used for project indicator reporting. This led to higher M&E expenditures per survey than the design anticipated. Additionally, where interventions are concentrated over many years in communities with small populations, regular surveying is highly likely to result in respondent fatigue, particularly when delays in implementation occur and respondents feel as if they are getting more surveys than benefits. This is also a particular concern for control community surveying. The revision of the indicators to rely more heavily on administrative data was crucial for project M&E success.
- 6.3 The project had two results-level indicators. Both were able to provide a method for measuring the main impact of the Project and were complementary in their ability to do this. Even so, they each suffered from intrinsic measurement drawbacks. Quantifications of access to improvements under ICBS Component 1 were hampered by concerns of overstatements due to double-counting. To minimise this, the project chose to use the beneficiary figures for the intervention type in each community with the highest beneficiary count. This method, therefore, was unable to take into account beneficiaries from other non-overlapping infrastructure intervention types, nor persons who had benefited from microfinance loans who might have otherwise not considered themselves beneficiaries from infrastructure interventions. The measurement of the second indicator, which tracks the perception of public safety in the communities, was impeded by the inability to measure that indicator through administrative data.
- 6.4 The original intermediate-level indicators were numerous and required extensive surveying to measure: they were not able to be measured passively through the use of administrative data collected through implementation of project interventions or by the state. They were formally revised in 2009. The revised indicators did provide a clear method for measuring the project's key outputs, as a whole.
- 6.5 The project's M&E indicators were used regularly throughout implementation to evaluate project progress and determine areas of weakness in need of focus.
- 6.6 Due to the revision of the project's indicators, a formula was recommended for calculating the target total of the indicators, to include work done in the years prior to the change as both targets and actual progress. The World Bank ISRs' calculations of the targets do not, however, seem to take these years into account, possibly due to differentiating approaches / loss of knowledge following personnel changes in the Bank and at JSIF. For ease of comparison, the World Bank-recognised targets have been used in calculating the achievements of the project.

VII. Project's Outcome

7.1 Rating: Satisfactory

7.2 The project was still relevant to both GoJ and wider Jamaican interests at the time of completion.

- 7.3 The project was effective in its outcomes. Both PDOs were met. The communities were generally satisfied with both project outcomes and project implementation. In 2013 Citizens' Report Card, 98% of respondents said they would welcome the JSIF back into their communities, 84% of respondents said the best projects were chosen for the communities, and 76% of respondents believed that the project got value for money. The project indicators paint a reasonable picture of project implementation success.
- 7.4 The efficiency of the project can be measured in terms of implementation efficiency, through the ratio of administrative to subproject expenditure, and development efficiency, through the cost of the investments in comparison to their benefit to the communities. As at 31 December 2013, JSIF had spent USD 1.62M in Recurrent Costs and Other Services (under the Project Management component) to provide 27.3M in infrastructural and social investment to the communities. This suggests high administrative efficiency, with recurrent costs and other services totalling 6% of direct investment expenditure. If all Project Management and Evaluation expenditure is considered (including the cost for providing major evaluations), then this represents a very reasonable 19.7% of direct investment expenditure. The cost-benefit analysis provided through the Impact Evaluation suggested a positive economic rate of return on the roads, education and skills training investments.

VIII. Additional Impacts

- 8.1 JSIF institutional capacity was widely and positively affected by the ICBSIP. JSIF gained significant experience in inner city project implementation, which also positively affected wider national capacity in this regard, due to knowledge sharing and the movement of former project staff to other government agencies. For example, an academic paper that focused on ICBSIP best practices (alongside that of one other project implemented in inner city communities) was presented at a national conference.
- 8.2 JSIF's capacity to implement infrastructure projects was generally increased under the ICBSIP, but particularly increased due to the mandated use of CPTED techniques and the process of improving the waterlogged soil at Knollis prior to construction of the community centre, since both of these were new to the organisation. The land tenure intervention also significantly improved JSIF's capacity to undertake these sorts of interventions and suggest policy improvements based on the experience.
- 8.3 The design and development of the national crime observatory made JSIF a pioneer in crime and injury surveillance through its product and partnership agreement with its major stakeholder, the Ministry of National Security, and the wide cross-section of other government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) which contribute to and benefit from the observatory.

IX. Sustainability – Risk to Development Outcome

- 9.1 Rating: Moderate
- 9.2 The ability of the relevant government MDAs to absorb and maintain the infrastructure investments, particularly where community maintenance is not possible (e.g. for underground sewage pipelines) presents a risk to the communities' development

outcomes. Although MoUs were developed with and signed by all relevant MDAs, fiscal constraints and internal prioritisation exercises may limit the ability of these entities to regularly carry out maintenance.

- 9.3 In terms of social investments, although JSIF successfully piloted a number of programmes under the ICBSF and the community committees received significant experience in managing these, the sustainability of these programmes may be limited by the ability of the communities to access funds, given the limited funding disbursed by NGOs, Foundations, etc. and the continued economic hardship experienced by these communities. Additionally, where programmes relevant to a specific government MDA have been piloted, these have yet to be scaled up and institutionalised.

X. Rating of the Bank at Design

10.1 Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

- 10.2 The Bank's input into the concept of the ICBSF, particularly in terms of its PDOs and the integration of the two main components, helped to make the project a success. Unfortunately, other elements of the design worked to the project's detriment – in particular, the hiring of a single foreign consultant to undertake infrastructure pre-formulation and baseline data collection.

- 10.3 The Project Appraisal Document's balance in terms of providing specificity as to what sort of interventions should happen under the project, as well as some latitude for change given changing conditions on the ground, allowed JSIF a clear framework for implementation. Some of the restrictions placed on the project did provide difficulties, however, due to the project's and the country's particular circumstances. The detailed and multi-layered structure of the budget categories hampered project implementation: during implementation, the needs across budget categories varied and the structure as imposed made it difficult to adjust and respond. Additionally, the initial decision to tender very large infrastructure projects proved to be a challenge: there were few contractors in the higher cost categories and fewer still willing to undertake the work given the location of the project communities. However, the Bank's acknowledgement of these and other design difficulties during implementation helped to ensure that lessons learned were acted upon: in the case above, the infrastructure projects were eventually broken into smaller packages, which allowed for their successful implementation.

XI. Rating of the Bank During Supervision

11.1 Rating: Satisfactory

- 11.2 The frequency of the Bank's supervision missions and the willingness of Bank staff to respond to expressed concerns were commendable. The JSIF found the support provided generally for the subcomponents of the project were good, but the project could have benefitted from additional Technical Support and input in new implementation areas (particularly microfinance and land tenure regularisation), given the Bank's extensive worldwide experience. Although the focus of both the JSIF and the Bank during the first two years of implementation largely rested on the need to redesign the basic infrastructure subcomponent, the provision of technical assistance for the relatively novel

elements during this time might have helped to speed up implementation and improve final results. Additionally, changes in Bank personnel, templates and reporting formats during the life of the project made for occasional disruptions to consistency.

- 11.3 In 2006, when ICBSP implementation began, the Bank had recently instituted its Client Connection system. Client Connection increased the transparency of the project's financial data and improved the efficiency of the JSIF's ability to manage the project's finances. However, the relative novelty of the system on both ends contributed to errors that, even after discussion with Bank support staff at the time, were not properly resolved until years after the fact. During the push toward resolution, the support of the Bank's team was crucial to the successful outcome.
- 11.4 The commitment of the Bank to see to the successful development and implementation of the crime observatory is highly commendable. The bank's responsiveness to allowing the reallocation of funds to facilitate the hiring of the best technical expertise in the field, has helped in the development of a more useful and optimal tool that can be measured against other observatories in the region.

XII. Rating of the GoJ

- 12.1 Rating: Satisfactory
- 12.2 The role and mandate of the JSIF was clearly established in the national poverty reduction strategy. The Government was highly supportive of ICBSP's innovative approaches furthering community-driven development through access to basic infrastructure services, associated employment, training, land tenure and social services. GoJ provided over USD 3M of counterpart funding to ICBSP in a timely manner, even when facing major fiscal constraints in managing macro-economic indicators. Government representatives on the JSIF's Board of Directors ensured that JSIF's operations were transparent and efficient, which resulted in JSIF continuing its operations through changes in Administrations. The Government could have better mediated the difficulties between the JSIF and National Water Commission (NWC) but, in the end, the NWC was unable to facilitate flat rates and wholesale household connections in the communities because of the magnitude of the investment and returns on same.
- 12.3 The Government of Jamaica and the JSIF implemented the ICBSP with due diligence and flexibility in responding to needs and implementation issues as they arose. The core objectives of the ICBSP were met and in many areas targets were surpassed.

XIII. Rating of JSIF

- 13.1 Rating: Satisfactory
- 13.2 The JSIF effectively implemented ICBSP. JSIF staff took on the challenge of transferring greater control and responsibility to community groups, which represented a departure from usual practice and increased their workload and implementation complexity. Administrative and investment costs compared favourably with both national and international benchmarks. The JSIF maintained procedural transparency and ISO 14001:2004 status and was recognized nationally for its innovative efforts to protect and

preserve Jamaica's natural environment. The pairing of the JSDF's Crime Observatory with ICBSP subproject interventions has allowed JSIF to carry out ground-breaking work in the field of crime prevention. JSIF also undertook gender mainstreaming in implementing its project interventions, although this was not specifically required of the project. See **Annex B: JSIF's Commitment to Gender Mainstreaming**

- 13.3 for further information on JSIF's approach and commitment to gender mainstreaming.
- 13.4 The JSIF made significant progress in developing the MIS as an effective management tool during the course of the project. Between 2006 & 2013, this MIS benefited from over 25 rounds of mid- to major improvements, to include: server and hardware updates, numerous updates of general project management software, and an upgrade to the general financial management software of the organisation.. Although there is still progress to be made, JSIF continues to make improvements to the MIS, from which other projects run by the organisation also benefit.
- 13.5 Despite this overall success, the JSIF faced some challenges in implementing the ICBSP. These included:
 - 13.5.1 Sporadic outbreaks of violence in the communities, despite the reductions achieved by the project, delayed project activities in the communities and posed obstacles to participation of community members in project activities that took place outside the communities (e.g. skills training) due to curfews, etc.
 - 13.5.2 Turnover of technical staff working on the project, often times to national/regional agencies due to their high quality, was responsible for some loss of momentum in implementation.
 - 13.5.3 The challenge in procuring surveying services for land registration, due to surveyors' unwillingness to work in the inner city, significantly delayed the land titling initiative.
 - 13.5.4 The work done under the ICBSP is a testament to the JSIF's ability to effectively partner with both public and private institutions. In spite of this, partnership agreements did occasionally fall through. This reduced the effectiveness of services such as electricity regularisation and resulted in the non-implementation of others, such as the household water connections and the sewage treatment plant for Tawes Meadows. Often, when these breakdowns occurred, the basic problem was often a mismatch between each institution's timeframe for implementation and resultant funding prioritisation.

XIV. Lessons Learned

- 14.1 The component- and subcomponent-specific lessons contained in this section are abridged: a full list of those lessons considered most critical by the Borrower are included in **Annex A: Further Lessons Learned**
- 14.2 . These include highlights for other projects.
- 14.3 Where possible, project communities should coincide with nationally-recognised community boundary lines, to allow for ease of recognition of project boundaries on the ground and in partnership discussions, as well as ease of M&E of project activities.

- 14.4 Sector buy-in for community development projects must be tangible, established and measured throughout the project. While communities may see certain projects as priority, if the Sector support is absent, then sustainability will be difficult. At the level of the donor and country partner, some level of commitment must be structured to ensure that funds invested in communities receive the required support from the large Sectors.
- 14.5 Infrastructure investments must be balanced with and complemented by social services. Complementary social service provision is essential to improving and maintaining access to the infrastructural works and intervention sustainability. Complementary technical assistance and the capacity building of national institutions (in both government and non-government sectors) are also integral to project success: in the case of the ICBSP, the support from the JSDF Grant through the development of the Crime Observatory and the participatory Community Action Plans, as well as the capacity building of NGOs and NSAs, were all very important to the project's capacity to achieve its development objectives.
- 14.6 Human capital development and capacity building is a prerequisite for successful project implementation in inner city environments.
- 14.7 In the case of projects with pre-formulated infrastructure components: depending on the type, size and volume of the intervention, a considered period for Design Review and Amendment should be included in the Project Design.
- 14.8 Management/Sustainability plans should be paramount in the consideration of: solid waste management initiatives, community centre design, and sewage treatment solutions.
- 14.9 The role of the liaison officers "on-the-ground"/interfacing with the community must be closely monitored from the onset to ensure that representatives of the various groups understand their role in the partnership. This sets the platform to attain community "buy-in" at large which is essential for the success of the intervention.
- 14.10 Communication/Training: Participatory approach in identifying needs, frequency in communication, and training are of high importance generally and are critical in empowering the CBOs to undertake their role in the maintenance of the infrastructure, educational-recreational, and mediation and conflict program.
- 14.11 Coordination with other donors with complementing objectives will contribute to narrowing the needs gap, eliminate "overlaps", and make for wider impact on the communities at large.
- 14.12 Coordination with Local Authorities/Agencies is crucial in avoiding conflict between existing/planned services and project investments. Without this coordination, the advancing of approval for work plans, and overall implementation of the project can be affected adversely.
- 14.13 A dedicated monitoring and evaluation coordinator would be an asset and help to ensure that M&E data is accurately, effectively and thoroughly collated, so that it can be produced in a timely manner.

14.14 The experience under the ICBSP has reinforced the importance of timely and accurate fiduciary management and reporting; the JSIF has added another layer of due diligence to facilitate this.

Crime Statistics:

14.15 Community stigma against ‘informers’ results in under-reporting of crime statistics, even those collected through informal means. This creates a difficulty for projects that are expected to improve community trust in external entities (including the police), but are also being judged against their reduction of extant crime statistics. As social trust goes up, crime reporting may also go up, although no ‘additional’ crime is actually taking place.

14.16 Highlight for other projects: The project experienced difficulties disaggregating crime data at the community level during the first years of project implementation: this has been significantly improved by the Jamaica Crime Observatory, which was put in place through the Japan Social Development Fund’s grant funding for the establishment of an Integrated Crime and Violence Information System.

COMPONENT- AND SUBCOMPONENT-SPECIFIC LESSONS (ABRIDGED):

Access to Services : Basic Infrastructure:

14.17 Thorough site investigations, appropriate designs and realistic construction schedules (that take into account each location’s social and geographic peculiarities) are paramount.

Access to Services : Access to Financial Services:

14.18 Consultation and educational processes must be extended to internal stakeholders, within the implementation agency, as well as to outside groups who will be necessary for project implementation. Technical assistance for implementing MFIs is also paramount.

Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building:

Building Community Capacity through Community-Based Contracting:

14.19 Community-based contracting is an important option to nurture and develop community capacity through “on-the-job-training. The ICBSP experience shows that the relevant question is not whether CBC is better than traditional methods, but rather in which circumstances and communities one method is preferable. CBC may require previous capacity building to work and generally requires additional time built into project timelines. However, ICBSP experience has shown that this methodology can work well.

Youth Education and Recreation:

14.20 There is continued need for: (i) the use of technology to deliver curriculum in centres and (ii) capacity building of schools to deliver remedial education by investing in school labs and software.

Mediation & Conflict Resolution:

14.21 The multi-modal programme developed under this subcomponent increased the interventions’ interest to the various at-risk groups.

Annex A: Further Lessons Learned

COMPONENT- AND SUBCOMPONENT-SPECIFIC LESSONS:

Access to Services : Basic Infrastructure:

- A.1 During Formulation stage – due diligence in a thorough site investigation, and appropriate designs are paramount to successful implementation of civil/infrastructure Works.
- A.2 Construction schedule should be realistic to the specifics of some locations, and management/updating of same must be constant.
- A.3 The provision of solid waste equipment and infrastructure was supported by the training of environmental wardens under the Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building component. However, incentivisation of all stakeholders – the wardens, the CBOs, the NSWMA and the community residents – through a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives, is necessary to improve the quality of work and the sustainability of the solid waste gains made under the project.
- A.4 Highlight for other projects: *strong environmental management record*: JSIF understands the potential impacts of its civil projects on the environment and its ISO-certified environmental management systems provide a crucial framework for encouraging environmentally positive practices. The JSIF has over 80% contractor compliance as regards the environmental safeguards that we have implemented. Breaches are quickly identified and reported and rectification takes place immediately. These environmental safeguards include:
 - A.4.1 Performing an environmental screening or baseline assessment prior to approval of any project for implementation.
 - A.4.2 Conducting a technical review of all project designs to ensure that environmental mitigation measures are included for any potential environmental issues identified during screening.
 - A.4.3 Employment of an environmental Scientist to monitor and report on projects environmental performance.
 - A.4.4 Weekly monitoring of projects by external supervisors, JSIF technical Officers, and environmental officer.
 - A.4.5 Provision of a copy of the JSIF’s Environmental Management Plan to each contractor as part of their contract document.

Access to Services : Access to Financial Services:

- A.5 The experience on this indicates the need for consultation and educational processes to be extended to internal stakeholders, within the implementation agency, as well as to outside groups who will be necessary for project implementation (e.g., the National Contracts Commission [NCC]).
- A.6 Future initiatives will benefit if the staff member charged with project management has a thorough knowledge of microfinance best practices and is able to devote his or her full time to the administration of the subcomponent.

- A.7 Highlight for other projects: The provision for technical assistance should be included in future microfinance initiatives, particularly when they seek to expand microfinance to new areas in which MFIs currently have little exposure.

Access to Services : Land Tenure Regularization:

- A.8 Land tenure regularization is a long and tedious process, especially for informal settlements, and involves multiple MDAs of government with varying roles and inadequate synergy to facilitate efficiency in the process.
- A.9 The establishing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the various agencies would provide for coordination, and awareness for all involved of the objective, and project-cycle of the intervention, and their responsibility/time-lines in this pursuit.

Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building:

Building Community Capacity through Community-Based Contracting:

- A.10 Differences in “baseline” capacities require design approaches suitable to the needs and capabilities of the communities. Hence, for example in the Zinc Fence Removal and Substitution, the national competitive bidding (NCB) (i.e., “traditional”) method of procuring a Contractor was used in Shelter Rock, while in Flanker where there was a greater capacity, the CBC method was used for implementation.
- A.11 Community-based contracting is an important option to nurture and develop community capacity through “on-the-job-training. The ICBSB experience shows that the relevant question is not whether CBC is better than traditional methods, but rather in which circumstances and communities one method is preferable. However, until confidence is built sufficiently within the CBOs, staff may be initially resistant to recommend this method of implementation for building capacity.
- A.12 Some of the challenges noted in undertaking CBC are as follows:
- A.12.1 Even though the CBC method is highly recommended for building community groups’ capacity, the methodology has negative impact on timely and efficient completion of subprojects.
- A.12.2 Difficulties compelling stakeholders to produce necessary documentation in a timely fashion meant that budget estimates for the quarter were difficult to make/meet.
- A.12.3 Many CBO members are volunteers and are doing the documentation in their spare time. Stipends to allow for the payment of administrative staff on the subprojects generally allow for more thorough documentation and more timely submission.
- A.12.4 Additional administrative support for photocopying and filing of CBC documentation is needed.
- A.13 Highlight for other projects: Other World Bank projects have experienced difficulties making sizeable impacts in urban environments. But in the urban environments in which the ICBSB works, CDD processes have specifically targeted poorer community residents, have reached sizeable numbers of beneficiaries, and have made gains in capacity building.
- A.14 Highlight for other projects: CBC as a method builds capacity in the groups but also requires additional time built into project timelines to take into account the challenges

described. Many sets of tranche documentation produced by the CBOs were returned, sometimes (up to 4 times) before the required documentation is correct and complete. The experience of the ICBSBSP has triggered a number of changes to how CBC is handled, namely i) the administrative burdens on the community groups going forward will be reduced as template booklets for financial management will be provided with the grant ii) the former will also improve the quality of documents produced as greater consistency and conformance will occur and iii) the management of the tranche and how they are disbursed will be better tagged to activities and submission of documentation will be incremental as opposed to being submitted at the time of tranche request.

- A.15 Highlight for other projects: The JSDF implemented a component using NGOs to support crime prevention activities in peripheral communities to the ICBSBSP. This allowed for increase in coverage to beneficiaries of like interventions to the vulnerable and it provided an opportunity for the NGOs to build their institutional capacity and profile in crime prevention and community development work.

Youth Education and Recreation:

- A.16 There is continued need for: (i) the use of technology to deliver curriculum in centres and (ii) capacity building of schools to deliver remedial education by investing in school labs and software.
- A.17 Highlight for other projects: The education programmes run by the ICBSBSP have reported significant community-buy in—across urban, peri-urban and rural areas. In all ICBSBSP communities, these popular programmes consistently have more applicants than programme resources are able to support. Community focus groups indicate that the ICBSBSP's education programmes are highly regarded by the communities; preliminary analyses have indicated high stakeholder satisfaction, particularly for parents and students. The high level of satisfaction and strengthened capacity of the Community Committees will improve likelihood of sustainability.

Mediation & Conflict Resolution:

- A.18 Highlight for other projects: The beneficiary numbers for the Mediation and Conflict Resolution programme have been significantly higher than expected, exceeding targets by over 400%. The variety of the activities that have been incorporated has increased the interventions' interest to the various at-risk groups. These activities have included: psychosocial interventions, life skills training through sports, sensitization sessions that incorporate cultural activities, sessions with rival gangs for the establishment of Community Stabilisation Youth Alliances and Community Stabilisation Agreements, and income-generating activities, among other interventions. Individual interventions tend to be multifaceted, such as the psychosocial interventions, which have incorporated beneficiary assessments, life skills training and psychological counselling, and are expected to result in significant behavioural change.

Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development:

- A.19 Highlight for other projects: Through this component, over 1,500 beneficiaries have received access to skills training programmes (in both traditional and non-traditional fields) and income-generation opportunities. Some participants have advanced through

the HEART Trust/NTA-NCTVET Level 1 certification to progress to the second level. The vocational skills programme has also been a model of partnership with both public and private-sector institutions: in addition to its partnerships with numerous CBOs, the Alternative Livelihoods programme has partnered with nine skills-training institutions, including the University of Technology, to endow community residents with employment-ready skills.

Annex B: JSIF's Commitment to Gender Mainstreaming

The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) is among twelve Government of Jamaica Ministries, Departments and Agencies that have been gender certified by the Bureau of Gender Affairs, a department that falls under the office of the Prime Minister.

The Gender Certification seeks to facilitate the implementation of the National Policy for Gender Equality (NPGE) and the process of gender mainstreaming. The purpose of the certification is to create greater gender awareness as well as strengthen the capacity of organizations to deliver equitable services both internally and externally. With this certification, the JSIF demonstrates that its operations are gender-compliant and that it recognises the value of gender mainstreaming as a vital component of its day-to-day operations. The stamp also demonstrates that the JSIF is committed to addressing obstacles to gender equality.

The principles of the NPGE guides the Project Appraisal process, ensuring that the greatest needs of all beneficiaries are addressed, with special consideration given to gender-specific circumstances and needs. In following the guidelines of the Gender Certification, the JSIF is also aware of Millennium Development Goal #3, which speaks specifically to empowering women and tries to ensure that an appropriate gender balance is met in all interventions.

Annex B: List of Supporting Documents

1. “Beyond Developmental Rhetoric: Unearthing Best Practices for Sustainable Social Investment in Inner City Communities in Jamaica.” Conference Paper. Presented at *Fifty-Fifty: Critical Reflections in a Time of Uncertainty* in Kingston, Jamaica. August 20-25, 2012.
2. “Bucknor Electrification Survey: Draft Report.” November 2012, Jamaica Social Investment Fund.
3. Hughes, Wesley and the Planning Institute of Jamaica. ‘A Historical Perspective on Poverty’. Contributing to A Series of Panel Discussions Organised by the Prime Minister. *The Transforming Landscape of Jamaica*. Kingston, Jamaica: Office of the Prime Minister, 2006
4. “ICBSP Microfinance Subcomponent Analysis and Lessons Learned.” November 2013, Jamaica Social Investment Fund.
5. “ICBSP Household Socio-economic Baseline Study. Jamaica: Technical Studies and Preparatory Activities for the Development of the Jamaica Inner City Basic Services Project (4041427)”, HTPSE Ltd, UK, 2005.
6. ICBSP Project Indicator Progress documents (all)
7. “Impact Evaluation of the Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project (ICBSP)”, Draft Final Report, Prepared for the Jamaica Social Investment Fund, Trevor Hamilton & Associates Center for Excellence, December 2013.
8. Inner City Basic Services for the Poor (ICBSP) Project Appraisal Document
9. “Inner City Basic Services For The Poor Project: Citizen’s Report Card (# 73005)”, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, 2013.
10. “Inner-City Renewal Programme: Rae Town Pilot Project.” Dissemination Workshop Presentation, July 20, 2004.
11. “Land Tenure Regularization: The Flankers, St. James Experience.” December 2013, Jamaica Social Investment Fund.

Internal World Bank Documents:

1. ICBSP ISRs Seq. No. 10-15.
2. ICBSP Aide Memoire, Supervision Mission, October 19-28 2009.